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Moore observed (1942, 543) that to assert, ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t 
believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’.1 The paradox is that this absurdity persists despite 
the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Moore did not notice that it is no less 
absurd of me to silently believe such a possible truth. Moore also observed (1944, 204) 
that to say, ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ would be likewise ‘absurd’. 
Unlike his first example, that has the omissive form 
(Om) p & I don’t believe that p, 
so-called because it reports the omission of a specific true belief, this has the commissive 
form, 
 (Com) p & I believe that not-p2
so-called because it reports the commission of a specific mistake in belief.3 What is the 
explanation of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs? The question 
matters, because diagnoses of the pathology of Moore-paradoxicality will tell us 
something about rationality in speech-acts, communication, belief and action.     
 In a recent paper in this journal, Hamid Vahid (2008) argues against three families 
of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach that 
                                                 
1  ‘Pictures’ is a rather archaic British term for ‘Cinema’. 
2  Formalizing ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ as ‘p & ~ Bp’ turns ‘I 
believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ into ‘Bp & ~ p’. This commutes to ‘~p & Bp’, which may be 
represented as ‘p & B~p’. 
3 These useful terms are coined by Sorensen (1988, 16). 
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Moore-paradoxical utterances are ‘assertorically defective’ (2008, 147, 148); I assert that 
p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion 
involves contradictory assertions (in the omissive case about my beliefs that p, and in the 
commissive case about whether p). The second is the epistemic approach that Moore-
paradoxical beliefs are ‘epistemically defective’ (2008, 153); one that is committed to: if 
I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it 
is impossible to hold a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. An analogue of this 
commitment delivers the same verdict in the commissive case. I propound this approach 
in (Williams 2004).4 The third is the conscious belief approach, that conscious Moore-
paradoxical belief is ‘doxastically defective’ (2008, 149) being committed to: if I 
consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious 
Moore-paradoxical belief, then I hold contradictory beliefs.5 Sidney Shoemaker (1998; 
1995) is a proponent of this approach. 
 Valid identifies two features that the three approaches have in common. Firstly, 
all three principles central to each are ‘ascent principles’ (2008, 147, 149) presumably so-
called because in each, an extra non-truth-functional operator is introduced (‘… believe 
that …’) or iterated (‘… justified in believing that …’, ‘… believe that …’) in the 
                                                 
4 The only other philosopher who explains the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical beliefs in terms of epistemic 
notions such as justification is Claudio De Almeida, who argues that there can be no non-overridden 
evidence for a Moore-paradoxical belief (2001) and who uses six epistemic principles to argue that a 
Moore-paradoxical beliefs makes one incoherent (2007). 
5  I will favor the descriptor ‘conscious-belief approach’ over Vahid’s own ‘doxastic approach’ for three 
reasons. Firstly, whatever is wrong with Moore-paradoxical belief is wrong epistemically, because the 
pathology of belief is an epistemological phenomenon. Secondly, conscious belief, not belief per se, is 
what occupies Vahid’s discussion [2008: §1.2]. Thirdly, Vahid includes in this family of explanations of 
doxastic Moore-paradoxicality, the self-falsification approach: that it is impossible to hold an omissive true 
Moore-paradoxical belief—but this will not generalize to the commissive case, nor is it about conscious 
Moore-paradoxical belief.    
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consequent of the principle.6 The second is that each approach identifies something 
contradiction-like, but without identifying it with the content of the Moore-paradoxical 
assertion or belief.7 Having objected to these sorts of explanation, Vahid argues for a 
Davidson-inspired defective-interpretation approach—that Moore-paradoxical utterances 
are ‘interpretively defective’ (2008, 157). Broadly speaking, this is the claim that charity 
requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore-paradoxical sentence as a speaker.  
I have my own reasons why the Wittgensteinian approach is untenable (Williams 
1998). However, while Vahid’s defective-interpretation approach is unsatisfactory, there 
are satisfactory versions of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches—so I will 
argue. Both do justice to the fact that when faced with Moore-paradoxical speaker, we 
want to say that in some sense, the speaker has contradicted herself, yet we see that there 
is no contradiction in what she has said.  
 In §2 I argue that Vahid’s account is too weak, mischaracterizes the absurdity and 
is incomplete. I then address Vahid’s endorsement of Anthony Brueckner’s two 
objections against my epistemic approach by modifying and developing it §3. In §4 I 
discuss Shoemaker’s version of the conscious-belief approach, one that starts from a 
criticism of David Rosenthal’s account of conscious belief. I argue that both the 
Rosenthal-inspired account of the absurdity, as well as Shoemaker’s, face objections. 
Although Vahid points out some of these, I make more serious objections that he does 
not. This provides the basis for §5, in which I argue for a better approach to Moore’s 
                                                 
6 Vahid is not explicit on this point. I can see nothing deeper than this in the ‘ascent thesis’. It seems an 
exaggeration to call the three families ‘a single strategy’ (2008 146).  
7 See (Heal, 1994, 6) following Wittgenstein. In his letter to Moore, Wittgenstein notes the importance of 
Moore’s discovery of an absurdity ‘which is in fact similar to a contradiction, though it isn’t one’ (1974, 
177). Vahid puts this as the less nuanced claim that all three families see the absurdity as stemming from 
the ‘violation of the law of non-contradiction’ (2008, 146). 
 3
paradox in terms of conscious belief. Then in §6 I explain the absurdity of Moore-
paradoxical assertion via that of Moore-paradoxical belief, in terms of justified belief and 
conscious belief. I conclude in §7 with some remarks on unifying and developing the 
epistemic and consciousness approaches to a wider domain of Moore-paradoxicality.    
 
2. Vahid’s defective-interpretation approach —and three objections to it.  
 
Davidson holds that a Tarskian truth theory is the appropriate form of a theory of the 
meaning of an object-language L: for each sentence s in it, there is a meaning-giving 
theorem of the form: s is true in L iff p, where ‘p’ is the translation of s into the meta-
language. When an interpreter finds that the speaker regularly assents to s under 
conditions she recognizes, she is entitled to take these as truth-conditions of s. For 
example, if we discover that a speaker regularly assents to s when and only when it is 
raining, we are entitled to think that s is true iff it is raining. However, one cannot assign 
meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker believes, while one 
cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean (Davidson, 
1985). Accordingly, Davidson proposes a principle of charity, roughly that we interpret 
speakers as holding true beliefs that are true by our lights, wherever it is rational for us to 
do so (Davidson, 1976). For example, since we normally believe that it is raining when 
and only when it is raining, we must also attribute that belief to a speaker of L who 
assents to s when and only when it is raining. On this account, which holds equally when 
the object-language and the meta-language are identical, we cannot take someone to be a 
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speaker at all unless we also take her to be largely rational by our lights. Nor can we take 
her as a speaker unless we take her as believing what she says. As Davidson puts it: 
If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterance and other behavior of a creature 
as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our standards, we have 
no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying 
anything (1985, 137, my italics) 
 
Vahid applies this account to assertions of the form of  




… when, having assented to “it is raining”, the speaker goes on to assert that she 
does not believe that it is raining, … the principle of charity is undermined … 
Moorean sentences are absurd … because their assertion is interpretively 
defective.  It is the very status of the utterer as a speaker … that is put at risk … 
(2008, 160) 
 
We may reconstruct this explanation more tersely. Assume, as is highly plausible, that 
utterance distributes over conjunction:  
If I utter ‘p & q’ then I utter ‘p’ and I also utter ‘q’. 
 
Then in uttering (Om), I utter ‘p’. But I also utter ‘I do not believe that p’. If my 
interlocutor takes my latter utterance as expressing a truth, then she must take me as not 
believing my first utterance, which, by the principle of charity, means that she cannot 
take me to be a speaker.  
 The parallel explanation of the absurdity of assertions of the form   
(Com) p and I believe that not-p. 
 
is that in uttering it, I utter ‘p’. But I also utter ‘I believe that not-p’.  If my interlocutor 
takes my latter utterance as expressing a truth, and also take me as rational enough to not 
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hold contradictory beliefs8, then she must take me as not believing my first utterance, 
which, by the principle of charity, means that she cannot take me to be a speaker (2008, 
162).  
 This account faces three objections. The first starts with a difficulty for 
Davidson’s account, namely that once we learn that someone is lying, and hence does not 
believe the content of her utterance, we must discount her as a speaker. But lies are still 
assertions, and we may understand the content of a lie, even once we know it is one. 
Indeed in judging a lie to be false, we judge it to have a meaning, for otherwise it would 
have no truth-value. Although a liar does not mean what she says, what she says still has 
a meaning.  
One heroic response is to deny that lies are genuine assertions but are rather bits 
of play-acting (Rosenthal 1995a, fn 15, 208). But then it would follow that I could refute 
your accusation that I have told you a lie by merely admitting that I was lying, for then I 
could not have told you anything. Davidson should reply instead that the principle of 
charity may be overridden by one’s knowledge or justified belief that the speaker intends 
to deceive her interlocutor (Vahid 2008, 161). But this reply will not help Vahid, for 
suppose that you learn that I am lying when I make a Moore-paradoxical assertion to you, 
and thus do not believe what I have asserted. This hardly expunges the absurdity. If 
anything it adds to it. But since the principle of charity cannot be applied, it cannot be the 
explanation of the persistent absurdity. Thus Vahid’s account is too weak. 
Secondly, on Vahid’s account we must say that someone who makes a Moore-
paradoxical utterance is, as Davidson puts it, not ‘saying anything’. But surely we do 
                                                 
8 At this point, Vahid seems to be appealing to the ‘violation of the law of non-contradiction’ (2008, 146), a 
move he thinks should be avoided.  
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understand the content of the utterance. After all it is a central feature of the paradox that 
sentences of the form of (Om) or (Com) express possible truths. I may fail to believe a 
specific certain truth and I may believe a specific falsehood. It is our recognition of this 
that partly explains our puzzlement when confronted with a Moore-paradoxical 
assertion—we hear a contradiction, she fail to find it in the content of the assertion. But if 
a Moore-paradoxical utterance were meaningless, it could not express a possible truth. 
Moreover if it were meaningless then it could not be the antecedent of a true conditional. 
Yet it might be true that:  
If it were the case that I hold the false belief that it is not raining then I would be 
surprised to discover that the streets are wet. 
 
Thus Vahid’s account mischaracterizes the absurdity.  
Thirdly, Vahid’s account is incomplete because it does nothing to explain the 
absurdity of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. It is no less absurd of me to believe such a 
possible truth of the form of (Om) or (Com) in silence. So the absurdity of the belief, as 
well as the assertion, needs explanation. Thus is it strange that although Valid objects to 
explanations of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical beliefs that I and Shoemaker give, he 
attempts no such explanation himself. In an apparent attempt to fill this lacuna, Vahid 
writes:  
Both doxastic and epistemic approaches take Moore’s paradox to be essentially a 
paradox about belief. Thus they give priority to thought over language and 
meaning … The interpretive approach, by contrast, upholds no priority theses.  
Linguistic meaning and mental content must be explained together, or not at all 
(Vahid 2008, 162).   
 
The priority thesis is roughly that the best strategy for an explanation of Moore-
paradoxicality is to explain the absurdity of Moore-paradoxicality in language via that of 
Moore-paradoxical belief.  But the fact that I explain the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical 
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belief in terms of justification, and Shoemaker in terms of conscious belief, does not itself 
commit us to the priority thesis—although I do endorse it in the last section. More 
importantly, the fact that Vahid’s explanation of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical 
assertions makes no commitment to the priority thesis does not entail that his explanation 
extends to the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief. On Vahid’s account, the putative 
meaningless of a Moore-paradoxical utterance is explained partly in terms of the absence 
of mental content, namely the speaker’s lack of belief in the content of her utterance. But 
it does not follow that a defect in mental content, in the form of Moore-paradoxical 
belief, has been explained in terms of linguistic meaning. In fact Vahid’s account cannot 
explain the absurdity of a Moore-paradoxical belief held by someone who never makes 
the corresponding assertion, because his account must start with the datum of an 
utterance. Besides, are beliefs the sorts of things that can be interpreted? It is not clear 
whether this idea makes sense.9
 
                                                 
9 Vahid claims that unlike the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches, his own ‘… does not depend for 
its success on the syntactic structure of Moorean sentences’ (2008, 162). I agree that the syntax of (Om) or 
(Com) is neither necessary nor sufficient for Moore-paradoxicality. My assertion or belief that God knows 
that I am an atheist has the essential absurdity of Moore’s examples, although it does not have the form of 
(Om) or (Com). And if eliminitivism is false and so unbeknownst to himself Paul Churchland believes his 
consistent assertion, ‘There are no beliefs (any more than there are vital spirits) and I don’t believe that 
there are no beliefs’ then his belief is simply false, not absurd. But I see no reason why my versions of the 
epistemic and conscious-belief approaches cannot be extended to deal with these cases. Moreover, in taking 
the utterance of the second conjunct or (Om) or (Com) as expressing a truth, to then be compared with the 
utterance of the first conjunct, Vahid’s interpreter needs to appeal to the syntax of conjunction. 
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3.  The epistemic approach: the impossibility of justified Moore-paradoxical belief 
 
Vahid (2008, 154–57) endorses Anthony Brueckner’s (2006) objection to my argument 
(Williams, 2004) that Moore-paradoxical beliefs are irrational because they are 
impossible to justify.10 This argument starts with this syllogism:  
 (1)  All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that 
tend to make me believe that p. 
 
(2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances 
that justify me in believing that I believe that p. 
So 
(3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that 
justify me in believing that I believe that p. 
 
This syllogism appears plausible once justification is conceived externally. But 
Brueckner (2006, 265) objects that (2) is implausible once justification is conceived 
evidentially: a person who possesses evidence that justifies her in believing that p might 
not tend to believe that p.  I concede this point. My response is to restrict the syllogism to  
rational believers. Then it will explain the impossibility of being justified in holding 
Moore-paradoxical beliefs, whether or not justification is construed externally or 
evidentially.11
The syllogism is plausible from an externalist view of justification. Consider (1). 
Typical circumstances in which I am externally justified in believing that it is raining are 
those in which I stand in the pouring rain with normal sensory apparatus. In these 
                                                 
10 Vahid has made two objections of his own elsewhere (Vahid 2005, 339–40) to which I have replied 
(Williams 2008, 169) in a way that Vahid himself now admits is plausible (Vahid 2008, 156). 
11 I mistakenly took (3) as meaning  
 
(EP) Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p. 
 
(EP), unlike (3), claims that my justification for believing that p is always identical to my justification for 
believing that I believe that p. Brueckner’s second objection is that this need not be true if the justification 
is evidential. I concede this point as well. In what follows I rely on (3) not (EP), thus evading the objection. 
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circumstances I will tend to believe that it is raining, whether or not I am rational. Next, 
consider (2). Circumstances in which I tend to believe that it is raining and in which I am 
externally justified in believing this, such as seeming to see rain, are those which, if I am 
rational, inductively justify me in thinking that I believe that it is raining. I don’t have to 
think, ‘whenever I seem to see rain, I usually believe that it is raining. I seem to see rain. 
So I probably believe that it is raining’. Nonetheless, if I am rational and someone asks 
me why I think I believe that it is raining, I am in a position to reply sensibly, ‘That’s 
nearly always what I think when I seem to see rain.’ 
How will the syllogism deal with justification conceived evidentially? Brueckner 
(2006) claims that my evidence that p is not evidence that I believe that p unless I possess 
the evidence, in the sense that I believe it and were I to believe that p on its basis, my 
belief would be justified. Now take (1) Suppose that I am in circumstances in which I 
come to know or justifiably believe some (e), which would justify my belief that p, 
should I form that belief on its basis. If I am rational, then I will tend to believe that p. 
Indeed it would be irrational of me not to tend to believe what my possession of evidence 
justifies me in believing. Next, consider (2). Suppose that I am in circumstances in which 
I tend to believe that p. Since we are also supposing that (1) is true in order to deduce (3), 
these are circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p because I possess 
evidence (e). So in sum, I am a rational agent in circumstances in which I believe (e) and 
in which were I to form the belief that p on that basis, as indeed I tend to do, my belief 
would be justified. This description of my circumstances is itself a justification for 
thinking that I believe that p. Of course I might not actually describe these circumstances 
as such. Nonetheless, if someone asks me why I think I believe that p, I am in a position 
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to reply sensibly, ‘That’s what any rational person would think who knows something 
like (e)’. 
(3) explains the absurdity of believing (Om). Suppose that I am rational and that 
there are circumstances in which I am justified in believing (Om). In these circumstances 
I am justified in believing the first conjunct. By (3), these are circumstances in which I 
am justified in believing that I believe that p. But in these circumstances I am also 
justified in believing the second conjunct and so I am justified in believing that I do not 
believe that p. This is impossible, because circumstances in which I am justified in 
believing that something is the case are circumstances in which I am not justified in 
believing that it is not the case. So unless I am irrational, there can be no circumstances in 
which I am justified in believing (Om). 
 The absurdity of believing anything of the commissive Moore-paradoxical form 
 (Com) p & I believe that not-p 
is explained by that fact that, supposing that I am rational,  
(3′) All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p are 
circumstances in which I am justified in believing that I don’t believe that 
not-p. 
 
Suppose that I am rational and that there are circumstances in which I am justified in 
believing (Com). In these circumstances I am justified in believing the first conjunct. By 
(3′) these circumstances are those in which I am justified in believing that I don’t believe 
that not-p. But in these circumstances I am also justified in believing the second conjunct 
and so I am justified in believing that I do believe that not-p. So unless I am irrational, 
there can be no circumstances in which I am justified in believing (Com). 
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(3′) follows from (3). Suppose that there is a circumstance in which I am rational 
that is a circumstance in which I am justified in believing that p. By (3) I am justified in 
believing that I believe that p. Since I am rational, I recognize that this renders me 
unjustified in believing that not-p. So I am justified in believing that I don’t believe that 
not-p. 
The following objection might be raised against this argument that deserves to be 
taken seriously. Suppose that I am in circumstances in which I am rational, I am 
evidentially justified in believing that p, and I tend to believe that p. I am not justified in 
believing that I believe that p unless I justifiably believe that I am in such circumstances. 
So against (2), it is not these circumstances that justify me in thinking that I believe that p 
but rather my justified belief that I am in these circumstances. 
I have two replies. Firstly, I see no reason to accept the claim that I am not 
justified in believing that I believe that p unless I justifiably believe that I am in such 
circumstances. We may as well accept weaker claims that what I need in order to be 
justified in thinking that I believe that p is that I am disposed to recognize that I am in 
such circumstances, or that I am in a position to cite my circumstances, or elements of 
them, such as my possession of evidence. Moreover, as a rational agent, I am so disposed 
and I am in such a position. Secondly, if the stronger claim is true, it is arguable that as a 
rational and therefore self-reflective agent, if I am in the relevant circumstances then I 
recognize that I am in them. 
Suppose however, that I am wrong and that the objection is correct. This suggests 
a different argument, this time not for the impossibility of having justification for Moore-
paradoxical beliefs, but rather for the impossibility of actually justifiably holding them. 
 12
I may be justified in believing that p, even if, for some reason, I do not actually believe 
that p. For example, seeing what looks just like rain falling outside my window, justifies 
me in believing that the streets nearby are wet, even if, for some reason, I do not form the 
belief that the streets nearby are wet. Let us say that I am justified in believing that p just 
in case, if I believe that p then I justifiably believe that p. Conversely, I justifiably believe 
that p just in case I believe that p and I am justified in believing that p.  
  On Brueckner’s view of things, my evidence that p does not justify me in 
believing that p unless I possess the evidence, in the sense that I believe it and were I to 
believe that p on its basis, my belief would be justified. In other words I am evidentially 
justified in believing that p only if for some e, I believe that e and if I were to believe that 
p on the basis of believing that e then I would justifiably believe that p. On my view of 
things, I am justified in believing that p only if I could produce good justification for 
believing that p. In other words, I could cite a good reason for believing that p. 
On either account it follows that  
 
(A)  If I believe that I don’t believe that p then I am not justified in believing 
that p 
  
  B~Bp → ~BJp 
  
Surely I cannot believe that p on the basis of my belief that e, as long as I think that I do 
not have the belief that p. Likewise I cannot produce a good justification for my belief 
that p as long as I think that I do not have that belief. This appears to be a necessary truth 
of psychology, rather than a necessary truth only of rational believers.   
On either account, it is definitionally true that 
(B) If I justifiably believe that p then I both believe that p and I am justified in 
believing that p 
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JBp → (Bp & BJp) 
Lastly, it is very plausible that justified belief distributes over conjunction:    
(C) If I justifiably believe that (p & q) then I justifiably believe that p and I 
justifiably believe that q 
 
JBp → (JBp & JBq) 
 
To illustrate this principle, suppose that I justifiably believe that it is both the case that it 
is wet in London and that it is cold in London. Then I justifiably believe that it is wet in 
London. And I also justifiably believe that it is cold in London. Illustrations cannot prove 
a principle, but the fact that the principle is apparently immune to counterexample is 
good enough reason to think that it is not only true but indeed constitutive of justified 
belief. 
Since (A) (B) and (C) are necessary truths, it follows that it is impossible to hold a 
justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief: 
 1. JB(p & ~Bp)   Suppose for reductio ad absurdum  
 2. JBp & JB~Bp   1, C 
 3. JBp    2, &-elimination 
 4. JB~Bp    2, &-elimination 
 5. B~Bp & BJ~Bp  4, B 
 6. B~Bp    5, &-elimination 
 7. ~BJp    6, A 
 8. Bp & BJp   3, B 
 9. BJp    8, &-elimination 
 10. BJp & ~BJp   7, 9, &-introduction.  Contradiction. 
 11.      ~◊JB(p & ~Bp)  1, 10, Reductio ad absurdum 
 
In order to prove that it is impossible to hold a justified commissive Moore-paradoxical 
belief, we need an analogue of (A): 
(A′)  If I believe that I believe that not-p then I am not justified in believing that 
p 
 
  BB~p → ~BJp 
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Surely I cannot believe that p on the basis of my belief that e, as long as I think that I 
believe that not-p. Likewise I cannot produce a justification for my belief that p as long 
as I think that I believe that not-p. Given that (A′) is also a necessary truth, this yields a 
proof parallel to that above: 
1. JB(p & B~p)   Suppose for reductio ad absurdum  
 2. JBp & JBB~p   1, C 
 3. JBp    2, &-elimination 
 4. JBB~p    2, &-elimination 
 5. BB~p & BJB~p  4, B 
 6. BB~p    5, &-elimination 
 7. ~BJp    6, A′ 
 8. Bp & BJp   3, B 
 9. BJp    8, &-elimination 
 10. BJp & ~BJp   7, 9, &-introduction.  Contradiction. 
 11.      ~◊JB(p & B~p)  1, 10, Reductio ad absurdum. 
 
I have just shown that it is impossible to hold a Moore-paradoxical belief that is 
internally justified. My syllogism for the impossibility of being externally justified in 
holding Moore-paradoxical beliefs remains sound. By (B) it follows that it is impossible 
to hold a Moore-paradoxical belief that is externally justified. Therefore it is impossible 
to hold a justified Moore-paradoxical belief in any sense of justification.  
  This result explains our puzzlement in thinking about Moore-paradoxical beliefs.  
We want to say that since their contents are possible truths, it should, in principle be 
possible to justify them. But this is not so. This explains the distinctive absurdity of 
Moore-paradoxical belief; it is absurd to hold a belief that you cannot in principle justify, 
despite the fact that it might be true. Such a belief is not just a belief for which any 
justification is very unlikely to ever materialize. Your belief that the number of stars is 
even would be absurd for a different reason—in fact you have no reasonable expectation 
of finding any justification for it. Unlike a Moore-paradoxical belief, the far-fetched 
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supposition that there is such justification (for example, the unlikely vindication of a 
theory of the origin of the universe that accurately predicts exactly 800 sextillion extant 
stars) is consistent.   
 
4. The conscious belief approach: Rosenthal and Shoemaker 
 
Sidney Shoemaker (1995) gives an account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief 
that starts from a criticism of David Rosenthal’s account of conscious belief (1997). 
According to Rosenthal, I am conscious of my belief that p just in case I have a ‘suitable’ 
thought about that belief.  Since my mere supposition that I hold a belief would not make 
me aware of a belief that I really do hold, the suitable higher-order thought in question 
had best be a belief. Rosenthal observes (1997, 471) that this second-order occurrent 
belief is suitable only if it represents not only the occurrence of the first-order belief, but 
also represents myself as myself in that state of belief. Consistently with this, Rosenthal 
holds a higher-order principle of conscious belief: 
(RP) If I consciously believe that p then I believe that p and I believe that I 
myself believe that p. 
 
BCp → (Bp & B*Bp) 
 
where ‘i*’stands for ‘I myself’, as an extension of Castañeda’s (1966; 1968) quasi-
indicator notation, according to which ‘x believes that x*Φ’ is read as ‘x believes that he 
himself Φ’.12 This de se element is needed. For even if I am Williams, my belief that 
                                                 
12 ‘x* Φ’ falls within the scope of a propositional attitude attributed to x, as in ‘x believes that x* is walking 
with a stoop’ or ‘x fears that x* is unattractive to women’. Not all uses of the reflexive pronouns ‘himself’ 
and ‘myself’, can be parsed as ‘x*’, for example, ‘He cut himself accidentally’ and ‘I disqualified myself 
on purpose’. 
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Williams believes that p would not capture my awareness of my own belief. For I might 
not realise that I am Williams, perhaps because I am suffering from amnesia. In such a 
case my belief that (p and Williams believes that that p) is not absurd.  
 Although Rosenthal himself thinks that all needs to be explained is the absurdity 
of Moore-paradoxical assertion, as opposed to belief, this suggests an explanation of the 
absurdity of conscious Moore-paradoxical belief. This explanation needs a second 
principle, namely that conscious belief distributes over conjunction. It seems 
unobjectionable to use ‘aware’ as a synonym of ‘conscious.’ Where N is a noun, whether 
an object such as a coin in my pocket or a mental state, surely I’m conscious of having N 
just in case I’m aware of having N. To say that I am conscious of a belief, fear, suspicion 
or toothache (or coin in my pocket) is just to say that I am aware of having it. Now 
suppose that I become aware of my belief that it is wet and cold. Surely I then become 
aware of my belief that it is wet and become aware of my belief that it is cold.  So it 
seems plausible that  
(D) If I consciously believe that (p & q) then I both consciously believe that p  
and I consciously believe that q.  
 
BC(p & q) → (BCp & BCq) 
It follows that if I consciously believe (Om) then I hold contradictory beliefs. Dropping 
the de se element in (RP) for ease of exposition, the proof is: 
 1. BC(p & ~Bp)    Suppose  
 2.  BCp & BC~Bp    1, D 
 3.  BCp     2, &-elimination 
 4.  BCp & BBp    3, RP 
 5.  BBp     4, &-elimination 
 6.  BC~Bp     2, &-elimination 
 7.  BBp & BC~Bp   5, 6, &-introduction13   
                                                 
13 Vahid (2008, 150, fn 6)  gives a similar derivation. 
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Shoemaker’s objection to this explanation is that it cannot explain what is wrong with 
Moore-paradoxical beliefs that are not consciously held. However, he claims that 
... believing something commits one to believing that one believes it, in the sense that … if one 
believes something, and considers whether one does, one must, on pain of irrationality, believe that 
one believes it. (1995, 214, my italics) 
 
Based on this, he proposes another principle that is supposed to show that Moore-
paradoxical belief is impossible, whether or not conscious, for rational subjects. This is 
what he calls the ‘self-intimation thesis’: 
(SI) If I believe that p then if I consider whether I believe that p, then I believe 
that I believe that p. 
 
Bp → (BCONp → BBp) 
Shoemaker thinks that this principle will deliver the result that if I have a Moore-
paradoxical belief, then I hold contradictory beliefs. Although Shoemaker does not say as 
much, he needs another two principles for this to go through, namely the distribution of  
belief over conjunction: 
 
(E) If I believe that (p & q) then I both believe that p, and I believe that q 
B(p & q) → (Bp & Bq) 
and the distribution of consideration over conjunction: 
 
(F) If I consider whether I believe that (p & q) then I both consider whether I 
believe that p, and I consider whether I believe that q  
  
BCON(p & q)  → (BCONp & BCONq) 
Both of these principles are plausible. The derivation now goes: 
 1. B(p & ~Bp) & BCON(p & ~Bp) Suppose 
2. B(p & ~Bp)    1, &-elimination 
3. BCON(p & ~Bp)   1, &-elimination 
4. Bp & B~Bp    2, E 
5.   Bp     4, &-elimination 
6. BCONp & BCON~Bp   3, F 
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7. BCONp     6, &-elimination   
 8. BCONp → BBp   5, SI 
9. BBp     7, 8, Modus Ponens 
10. B~Bp     4, &-elimination 
 11. BBp & B~Bp    9, 10, &-introduction 
Given that a rational subject cannot hold contradictory beliefs, it follows that a rational 
thinker cannot believe (Om). 14
Both of these accounts are objectionable. Some objections are particular to each, 
but the most serious objections afflict both. The Rosenthal-inspired account fails to 
account for the fact that in becoming aware of holding a belief, I not only become aware 
of that belief itself but also become aware of myself as holding it. Admittedly, my 
second-order belief that I believe that it is raining represents myself. But I may be 
unaware of holding this second-order belief. In that case my second-order belief is not a 
conscious representation of myself. So holding it does not guarantee that I am aware of 
myself.   
Rosenthal could fix this by modifying his principle to: 
(RP′) If I consciously believe that p then I believe that p and I consciously 
believe that I myself believe that p   
 
BCp → (Bp & BC*Bp) 
 
But this would entail a vicious infinite regress. On Rosenthal’s account my second-order 
belief is a thought that occurs to me just after I have formed the thought that constitutes 
my first-order belief. So the modification would saddle us with an infinite succession of 
discrete mental performances that not even the most rational thinker could complete. By 
contrast, Shoemaker’s self-intimation thesis entails no infinite regress because of the 
clause about hypothetical considerings. 
                                                 
14 Vahid (2008, 151) makes a similar point. 
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 Shoemaker’s account comes with two problems of its own. The first is that the 
derivation of contradictory beliefs needs to start with the supposition that the Moore-
paradoxical belief is actually considered. In other words, Shoemaker’s account fails to 
explain the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical beliefs that one does not consider. But surely 
a Moore-paradoxical belief remains absurd even when its believer does not consider 
whether he holds it. The only way out is to drop the consideration clause from the self-
intimidation thesis to give: 
(SI′) If I believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. 
 
Bp → BBp  
But now the self-intimidation thesis is much less plausible, even as a claim about rational 
subjects. Surely I may have beliefs that are repressed that I don’t think I have. Why 
should that make me irrational? True, I am ignorant of my mental states—but ignorance 
isn’t irrationality. True, the tool of introspection I have at my disposal is limited—but 
rationality is a matter of how well I use the tools, limited or not, that I have at my 
disposal. Worse still, the self-intimidation thesis now entails an infinite regress of 
beliefs.15  
 The second problem particular to Shoemaker’s account is that there are Moore-
paradoxical beliefs the absurdity of which Shoemaker cannot explain. The self-
intimidation thesis is false in a case in which I believe that p but I don’t believe that I 
believe that p, upon considering whether I believe that p. Self-deception seems to show 
such that such a case is possible. For example, my assertion that I don’t believe that 
women are inferior may be sincere, even after I have considered whether I believe that 
                                                 
15 Vahid (2008, 152) makes a point similar to this last sentence. 
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women are inferior, because I am blind to the way I treat women. But you may be in a 
better position to recognize that my boorish behavior is the manifestation of the existing 
belief that I sincerely deny having. In other words: 
I believe that women are inferior but I don’t think that I believe they are.   
Now suppose that I hold a true belief that this is so. If we substitute p for I believe that 
women are inferior, this becomes a case in which I truly believe that (p but I don’t 
believe that p). I now have an omissive Moore-paradoxical belief the absurdity of which 
cannot be explained in terms of the truth of Shoemaker’s self-intimation thesis. So 
Shoemaker’s account is incomplete.16
 In fact neither account is complete, because neither account can explain the 
absurdity of commissive Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Supposing that I believe (Com), both 
accounts predict only that I believe that I both believe that p and believe that I believe 
that not-p. The derivation for the Rosenthal-inspired account goes as: 
 1. BC(p & B~p)    Suppose  
 2.  BCp & BCB~p    1, D 
 3.  BCp     2, &-elimination 
 4.  BCp & BBp    3, RP 
 5.  BBp     4, &-elimination 
 6.  BCB~p     2, &-elimination 
 7.  BBp & BCB~p   5, 6, &-introduction 
 
The derivation on Shoemaker’s account goes: 
 
1. B(p & B~p) & BCON(p & B~p) Suppose 
2. B(p & B~p)    1, &-elimination 
3. BCON(p & B~p)   1, &-elimination 
4. Bp & BB~p    2, E 
5.   Bp     4, &-elimination 
6. BCONp & BCONB~p   3, F 
7. BCONp     6, &-elimination   
 8. BCONp → BBp   5, SI 
9. BBp     7, 8, Modus Ponens 
                                                 
16 Vahid makes this point (2008, 153), with the same example. 
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10. BB~p     4, &-elimination 
 11. BBp & BB~p    9, 10, &-introduction 
Thus neither account predicts a pair of contradictory beliefs. This is related to a more 
serious problem, namely that the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief cannot be 
adequately explained in terms of a pair of contradictory beliefs, with the result that 
neither account is able to even explain the absurdity of believing (Om). The irrationality 
of Moore-paradoxical belief is surely severer than that of holding a pair of contradictory 
beliefs (De Almeida 2001, 43; Kriegel 2004) for we may consistently suppose that I have 
contradictory beliefs because I am unaware of one or both of them. For example, a visit 
to a psychiatrist might unearth my long-repressed belief that my mother was an adulterer 
that persists in the face of my sincere adult assertion that she was not. Before the visit I 
held a pair of contradictory beliefs about my mother. But since I was not aware of both 
beliefs I was in no position to revise them. At that stage it would be harsh to judge me 
‘absurd’. A better account would diagnose the irrationality of Moore-paradoxical belief 
as a single belief in a self-contradiction, as when I believe that both p and not-p. It is 
more irrational to hold a self-contradictory belief than to hold a pair of contradictory 
beliefs. For self-contradictory beliefs are less conducive to truth than pairs of 
contradictory beliefs. When I hold contradictory beliefs half of my beliefs are bound to 
be true. But none of my self-contradictory beliefs can be true. Even more absurd or 
irrational would be to be aware of a self-contradictory belief while refraining from 
revising my beliefs. With this in mind, I propose a better account of the absurdity of 




5. The conscious belief approach: a better version  
 
Although belief distributes over conjunction, it does not collect over conjunction. I may 
be unable to think the thought of the huge conjunction of all of my present beliefs 
although I have the ability to think the thought of each of my present beliefs separately—
not because I lack the relevant concepts needed to think the would-be thought, but rather 
because that thought is just too complex for me to think. Moreover, my beliefs appear to 
be innumerable. In believing that I live at least ten miles away from London Bridge don’t 
I also, at least unconsciously, believe that I live at least eleven miles away from London 
Bridge and believe that I live at least twelve miles away from London Bridge … and so 
on? While I have the ability to think each thought in this series, I surely do not have the 
ability to think the thought of their conjunction, for that would be a thought I could never 
finish thinking. But then I could not even hold an unconscious belief of the conjunction 
of everything I now believe, given, as is plausible, Searle’s Principle (1992, 155–162):  
 If I believe that p then I have the ability to think the thought that p.  
By contrast it seems that conscious belief both distributes and collects over conjunction: 
(G) I consciously believe that (p & q) just in case I both consciously believe 
that p and I consciously believe that q. 
 
  B (p & q) ↔ (B p & B q) C C C
This is very plausible against the background of the ‘synchronic unity of consciousness’ 
(Bayne 2008; Bayne forthcoming; Tye 2003): all the conscious states you have at a given 
instant are unified into a single encompassing state. Thus, in consciously believing that it 
is wet at the same instant as consciously believing that it is cold, you are, at that instant, 
consciously believing that it is wet and cold. So an interesting feature of consciousness is 
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that in becoming aware of each of a pair of contradictory beliefs, I become aware of a 
single belief in a self-contradiction.  
 We now need a principle in the spirit of Rosenthal’s (RP) that both avoids an 
infinite regress of beliefs and that entails that in holding a conscious belief, I am aware of 
myself.  The principle that does the trick is:  
(H) If I consciously hold the first-order belief that p, then I both consciously 
hold the first-order belief that p and I consciously believe that I believe 
that p  
 
B p → (B p & B Bp)1C 1C 2C 17
The restriction of the antecedent to first-order beliefs blocks the regress.18 And 
since the consequent predicts that I am aware of my belief that I believe that p, this 
second-order belief is conscious representation of myself. So holding it guarantees that I 
am aware of myself.   
I need only these two principles to explain the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical 
belief. If I consciously hold the omissive belief that (p & I don’t believe that p) then I 
consciously believe that I both do and don’t believe that p.  The proof of this is: 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking, this should be 
 
If I consciously hold the first-order belief that p, then I both consciously hold the first-order belief 
that p and I consciously believe that I myself believe that p  
 
B p → (B p & B1C 1C 2C*Bp) 
 
For ease of exposition, I drop the de se element in what follows. Nothing turns upon this. 
 
18 This is an improvement upon my earlier suggestion (Williams 2006, 402) of the principle 
 
If I consciously believe that p then I consciously believe that p and I consciously believe that I 
believe that p  
 
B p → (B p & B Bp) C C C
where the principle comes with the restriction that it may only be applied a finite number of times, in order 
to avoid infinite regress. It might be objected that this restriction is ad hoc. 
 
 24
1.  BC2(p & ~B1p)   Suppose conscious omissive belief 
 2.  BC1p & BC2~B1p   1, G 
 3.  BC1p     2, &-elimination 
 4.  BC2~B1p    2, &-elimination 
 5.  BC2BB1p    3, H 
 6.  BC2~B1p & BC2BB1p   4, 5, &-introduction 
 7. BC2(~B1p & B1p)   6, G 
 
This result provides a pathology of the Moore-paradoxical believer: in becoming 
conscious of my omissive belief, I become aware that I believe a self-contradiction. 
Unless I change my beliefs, I am mad. A different pathology emerges for the commissive 
belief: If I consciously hold the commissive belief that (p & I believe that not-p) then I 
consciously believe that I hold a pair of contradictory beliefs. The proof of this is: 
1.  BC2(p & B1~p)   1. Conscious commissive belief 
 2.  BC1p & BC2BB1~p   1, G 
 3.  BC1p     2, &-elimination 
 4.  BC2BB1~p    2, &-elimination 
 5.  BC2BB1p    3, H 
 6.  BC2BB1p & BC2B1B ~p   4, 5, &-introduction 
 7. BC2(B1p & B1~p)   6, G 
 
In other words, in becoming conscious of my commissive belief, I become aware that I 
hold contradictory beliefs (or beliefs that are transparent to me as contradicting each 
other). Unless I revise my beliefs, I am damaged goods. A difference in pathology is what 
we should expect, given the difference between a specific instance of ignorance (in the 
omissive belief) and a specific mistake in belief (in the commissive belief). 
The occurrence of conscious belief amounts to a recognition of irrationality. The 
irrationality is not a good thing, but the recognition of it is, because it amounts to the 
capacity for belief-revision. If that epiphany leads me to no epistemic revision, then I am 
indeed irrational. For then I realize that I hold contradictory beliefs yet continue to hold 
them. Such a case might occur when exasperated by a particularly obtuse psychiatrist 
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who keeps reassuring me that my belief that I am the victim of persecution is just a 
delusion, I remark, ‘Look here, I jolly well know that people aren’t persecuting me, but I 
just can’t help believing that they are!’ 
 There remains a question to be answered: how is the absurdity of unconscious 
Moore-paradoxical belief to be explained? The answer is to be found in the fact holding a 
Moore-paradoxical belief falsifies it, on pain of holding contradictory beliefs. First take 
the omissive belief. If I believe that (p & I don’t believe that p), then since belief 
distributes over conjunction, I believe that p. But then what I believe is false, since its 
second conjunct is false. Although my belief is not a belief in a necessary falsehood it is 
self-falsifying. In other words, although what I believe might be true of me and although 
I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I believe it. In contrast, I can hold a true 
commissive belief. For if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then since belief 
distributes over conjunction, again I believe that p, contradicts the second conjunct of 
what I believe. So unless (Com) is false, I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.   
 Suppose however that I hold the Moore-paradoxical belief but am not conscious 
of it. It seems that I am still irrational in some sense. My belief contains a structural flaw, 
even if I do not see it. It is tempting to say that I am irrational in the sense that holding 
the belief leads me inescapably to falsehood. However, there is reason to think that this is 
an overgeneralization. For suppose, as a case of epistemic modesty, that   
(α) I believe that (β) at least one of my beliefs is false. 
 
Necessarily, either my second-order belief reported by (α) is true or it is false. If it is true 
then it is true. If it is false, then (β) is false. In that case all my beliefs are true and 
therefore my second-order belief reported by (α) is also true. So necessarily, my second-
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order belief reported by (α) is true. That belief is self-verifying. Once I believe (β), (β) 
must be true. So if I believe (β) then I must have at least one false belief. In other words, 
if I believe (β) then I have beliefs that are inconsistent, in the sense that at least one of 
them must be false. But (β) might be true. And it may be irrational of me not to believe 
(β) given inductive evidence about beliefs I have had in the past that turned out to be 
false.19 In that case, rationality demands that I hold inconsistent beliefs.20 My belief in 
(β) leads me inescapably to falsehood, yet I am not thereby irrational. This result also 
shows that Mitchell Green is wrong to diagnose the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical 
belief as ‘a severe violation of theoretical rationality’ (2007, 191) just because it is a case 
in which ‘my system of beliefs is guaranteed to put me in error no matter how the world 
happens to be, and in a way that I could in principle discern with no empirical 
investigation’ (2007, 191).21 For we have just discerned with no empirical investigation 
that my belief in (β) is exactly such a case! 22  
The truth of my belief that I hold at least one false belief does not entail beliefs 
that contradict each other. Clearly I need not believe that all of my beliefs are true. We 
                                                 
19 Doris Olin (2003, 68–69) objects that induction from past error is illegitimate. Suppose I arrive at my 
beliefs by reading tea-leaves. That method has led to error, yet the inference that new beliefs so formed are 
likely to be in error is illegitimate because the set of beliefs that are the negations of the former beliefs 
would not be less likely to be in error. Richmond Campbell (2004, 311) points out that that is because the 
connection between tea-leaf reading and truth is random. Given that, the likelihood of error is great in 
either set, but this fact in no way undermines the original inference. 
20 This case has only a slight resemblance to the Liar sentence. Although (α) refers to itself, its truth does 
not entail its falsehood nor conversely; and likewise for (β). It is worth noting that this argument for the 
possibility of rational inconsistent beliefs is far simpler than preface-paradox arguments to which Doris 
Olin objects (2003, 65–70) and is not vulnerable to these.     
21 This last condition is needed because Jane is not absurd in believing that Hesperus is shining but 
Phosphorous is not, if she needs empirical investigation to discover that Hesperus is Phosphorous (2007, 
192). Her system of beliefs is guaranteed to put her in error no matter how the world happens to be, but not 
in a way that she could in principle discern with no empirical investigation.   
22 Green adds that ‘Harbouring an absurd belief need not make her irrational; perhaps she is irrational only 
if she violates theoretical rationality in a way that would be open to minimal, as opposed to extensive, 
reflection’ (2007, 192). But if she is guilty of a severe violation of theoretical rationality, shouldn’t that 
make her irrational? 
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have already seen that I cannot believe the ‘fat conjunction’ of all my beliefs. Even if I 
did believe it, it would not contradict my belief that I have at least one false belief, unless 
the fat conjunction includes the final conjunct ‘and these are all the beliefs I hold’. We 
are unable to believe this extra conjunct. We are in no position to list the innumerably 
many beliefs we hold, many of which we are unaware of holding.  
This explains why a commitment to the necessity of at least one false belief is 
benign. Inconsistency in my beliefs need not undermine my justification in the way my 
self-contradictory or contradictory beliefs do. Justification for my belief that I hold at 
least one false belief, such as the fact that I have held false beliefs in the past, need not 
count against any particular one of the vast number of other beliefs I now hold. Nor will 
justification for any particular one of these other beliefs, count in favour of my 
infallibility. 
 One way to avoid this difficulty is to appeal to the degree to which falsehood is 
specific. If I believe (Om) then what gets falsified is the belief itself. In this respect my 
belief is like a belief in a necessary falsehood, for in that case as well what is inescapably 
false is the belief itself. The falsehood to which I am lead is therefore maximally specific. 
Now consider my belief in (Com). Given the charitable assumption it is true, one of my 
two contradictory beliefs about whether p must be false. So the falsehood to which I am 
lead is minimally less specific than the maximal case. By contrast, in the case of 
epistemic modesty I am lead only to the falsehood of one of my innumerably many 
beliefs. So the falsehood to which I am lead is minimally specific. So the correct thing to 
say seems to be that in holding a Moore-paradoxical belief even unconsciously, I am 
irrational in the sense that holding the belief leads me inescapably to highly specific 
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falsehood. We may even stipulate that falsehood is highly specific just in case it is either 
the falsehood of one specific belief or the falsehood of one of two beliefs.23  
Since holding a Moore-paradoxical belief leads me inescapably to highly specific 
falsehood I am responsible for being in an epistemically bad position. A self-falsifying 
belief is as useless as a guide away from falsehood as a pair of contradictory beliefs. In 
holding a Moore-paradoxical belief, even unconsciously, I have shot myself in the foot. 
Nonetheless, if I am unaware of holding the belief I can hardly be expected to see that 
this is so. Moreover, I can hardly be blamed for not revising beliefs of which I am 
unaware. I submit that this result coheres nicely with our intuition that any irrationality in 
unconscious Moore-paradoxical belief is far milder than the severe irrationality of 
conscious Moore-paradoxical belief. 
 
6. The absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion 
 
Let us now take a closer look at the priority thesis—roughly that the best strategy for an 
explanation of Moore-paradoxicality is to explain the absurdity of Moore-paradoxicality 
in language via that of Moore-paradoxical belief. Its leading exponent, Shoemaker, 
asserts the restriction that   
What can be coherently believed constrains what can be coherently asserted  
 
but adds that the converse does not hold. Since ‘coherently’ is polysemous between 
‘consistently’, ‘appropriately’ ‘intelligibly’ and ‘rationally’ the restriction is best 
                                                 
23 Alternatively, we could just content ourselves with saying that holding the belief is self-falsifying unless 
the believer holds contradictory beliefs. 
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elucidated using Moore’s own term ‘absurdly’, by which he seems to mean ‘irrationally, 
either in theory or practice’. Then Shoemaker’s restriction becomes 
If my belief that p is absurd then so is my assertion that p, but not conversely.   
 
I can offer no knock-down argument for this principle. But it is plausible to the extent 
that it is apparently immune to counterexample. The failure of its converse is shown by 
my assertion 
 I am asserting nothing now. 
 
Such an assertion would be absurd. Although the content of my assertion might be true 
and although I might assert it, it cannot be true if I assert it. As a reasonable speaker I 
would recognize that the assertion is self-falsifying in this way and so would not make it.   
But it would not be absurd at all of me to believe that I am asserting nothing now. I might 
be meditating in church.    
Shoemaker’s formulation of the priority thesis is that because sincere assertions 
involve believing their content, once an explanation of the impossibility of believing 
them is at hand, ‘an explanation of why one cannot assert a Moore-paradoxical sentence 
will come along for free’ (Shoemaker 1996, 213) 
It is helpful to remember that Shoemaker is talking of rational agents. I agree that 
we should require an explanation of why Moore-paradoxical beliefs cannot be rational. 
Nor can it be rational to make the corresponding assertion. But there are two problems 
with the way Shoemaker makes his point. In the first place, applying the priority thesis 
only to assertions that are sincere, will not explain the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical 
lies, for the reasons I have given in discussing Vahid’s account. Secondly, it is an 
exaggeration to say that the explanation of the irrationality of the assertion comes ‘free’ 
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with that of the corresponding belief. For once we have explained why the belief is 
irrational we will also have to explain why this makes the corresponding assertion 
irrational.  
A popular explanation of this is that an assertor is irrational if she ‘expresses’ an 
irrational belief. But that in turn means that the notion of expressing belief will need 
elucidation—a need that is not always met in the literature24. And it will also need to be 
explained why, on this elucidation, expressing an irrational belief is itself irrational. 
 Both my approaches accommodate such an explanation. On the first approach, my 
Moore-paradoxical assertion is absurd because in making such an assertion, I express a 
belief that cannot in principle be justified. I assert to you that p just in case I ostensibly 
express my belief that p to you with the intention of changing your mind in a relevant 
way. The reference to ostensible expression accommodates lies, which are surely genuine 
assertions. The change of mind I intend to bring about is relevant in the sense that the 
proposition I assert forms the core of the description of that change. For example, in lying 
to you that p I intend to get you to falsely believe that p, and in letting you know that p I 
intend to impart to you my knowledge that p. I ostensibly express my belief that p to you 
just in case I behave in a way that intentionally offers you reason to think that I believe 
that p. When my assertion is Moore-paradoxical, what I offer you is a reason to think that 
I have a belief that I cannot possibly justify. Since such beliefs are irrational, I have 
offered you a license to think that I am irrational. Given my charitable presumption that 
you will charitably avoid judging me irrational when I attempt to communicate with you, 
I am in a position to see that you will not accept my assertion. So if I persist in my 
                                                 
24 No elucidation of the term is given by Wittgenstein (1980a, §472), Heal (1994, 22), Hájek and Stoljar 
(2001) or Rosenthal (1995a, 197, 199 and 1995b, 317–319], all of whom follow the ‘expressivist’ approach 
described above.
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assertion I am irrational in action, in the sense that I am trying to achieve something I can 
see won’t succeed. 
 On the conscious belief approach, the explanation is different. You have no 
reason to believe what I assert to you unless you think that I believe my own assertion. In 
other words, believing my assertion requires that you believe me, in the sense that you 
believe that I am sincerely telling the truth. Now suppose that you believe that I am 
sincerely telling the truth when I assert to you that (p and I don’t believe that p). You 
must think that I believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me sincere) and you must, in 
the same instant, believe that I don’t believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me to be 
telling the truth). These are conscious thoughts that you form as I make my assertion to 
you. Since your conscious beliefs collect over conjunction, you consciously believe that I 
both do and don’t believe that p. If you are rational, you will not believe me. I am in a 
position to see, when I make the assertion to you, that you won’t believe me unless you 
are deeply irrational. Since I should be charitable enough to try to avoid judging you 
irrational when I attempt to communicate with you, I should see that you couldn’t believe 
me. 
  A parallel line of reasoning applies to the commissive assertion.  Suppose that you 
come to believe me when I assert to you that (p and I believe that not-p). You must now 
think that I believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me to be sincere) and you must now, 
in the same instant, believe that I believe that not-p (in virtue of now thinking me to tell 
the truth). Since these two beliefs you have just acquired are conscious thoughts, you now 
consciously believe that I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p. Because this is in 
effect a judgment that I am irrational, I am in position to see, when I make the assertion 
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to you, that you won’t believe me unless you judge me irrational. And since I should see 
that you would be charitable enough to try to avoid judging me irrational when I attempt 
to communicate with you, I should again see that you couldn’t believe me.   
In either case I should revise my plans.  If I do not, then I am irrational in action.   
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
 
 
There appear to be other propositions that are absurd to believe, and therefore to assert, in 
the same way as (Om) or (Com).  Plausible candidates include Sorensen’s (1988) 
I have no beliefs 
God knows that I am an atheist 
 
Although your think all my opinions are mistaken, you are always right 
 
as well as others that might be related, such as   
 
I believe that it is raining but I have no justification for believing that it is raining 
 
 It is raining but I don’t know that it is raining. 
There are also ‘self-referential’ candidates such as  
 I believe that this sentence is false 
 
as well as problem cases, as when Paul Churchland makes the consistent assertion that 
There are no beliefs (any more than there are vital spirits) but I don’t believe that 
there are no beliefs. 
 
How will the epistemic and consciousness approaches handle these cases? Will they co-
operate in handling them? More generally, how do we go about producing a full or partial 
analysis of Moore-paradoxicality in the first place, so that we may judge which cases 
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share the essential absurdity of Moore’s own examples? If I am on the right lines so far, 
these are questions I should answer. But that seems best left as a separate task.25  
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